Matching as a cure for underprovision of voluntary public good supply

C-Tier

Journal: Economics Letters

Year: 2012

Volume: 117

Issue: 3

Pages: 727-729

Authors (3)

Buchholz, Wolfgang (Universität Regensburg) Cornes, Richard (not in RePEc) Rübbelke, Dirk (Technische Universität Bergaka...)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

Matching mechanisms are widely regarded as providing a promising way to cure the public good underprovision problem, but the Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium emerges only under very special conditions. However, we show that public good underprovision is normally avoided.

Matching as a cure for underprovision of voluntary public good supply

Authors (3)

Abstract

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