Richard Cornes

Institution: Unknown

Primary Field: Public (weighted toward more recent publications)

First Publication: 1979

Most Recent: 2019

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period	S (4x)	A (2x)	B (1x)	C (½x)	Total	Percentile
Last 5 Years	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-
Last 10 Years	0.00	0.00	2.69	0.34	3.03	58%
All Time	18.84	17.49	7.40	7.15	50.88	98%

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 37

Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 35.15

Publications (37)

Year	Article	Journal	Tier	Authors
2019	Two‐Aggregate Games: Demonstration Using a Production–Appropriation Model	Scandanavian Journal of Economics	B	3
2018	Public goods and public bads	Journal of Public Economic Theory	C	3
2016	Aggregative Environmental Games	Environmental & Resource Economics	B	1
2015	Pareto improvement through unilateral matching of public good contributions: The role of commitment	Economics Letters	C	4
2014	Potentially Harmful International Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision	Economica	C	3
2012	Matching as a cure for underprovision of voluntary public good supply	Economics Letters	C	3
2012	Fully aggregative games	Economics Letters	C	2
2012	Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests	Economic Theory	B	2
2012	Private provision of public goods between families	Journal of Population Economics	B	3
2011	Interior matching equilibria in a public good economy: An aggregative game approach	Journal of Public Economics	A	3
2011	Interior matching equilibria in a public good economy: An aggregative game approach	Journal of Public Economics	A	3
2010	On the Private Provision of Two or More Public Goods	Journal of Public Economic Theory	C	2
2007	Weak links, good shots and other public good games: Building on BBV	Journal of Public Economics	A	2
2007	Aggregative Public Good Games	Journal of Public Economic Theory	C	2
2006	On the Frequency of Interior Cournot–Nash Equilibria in a Public Good Economy	Journal of Public Economic Theory	C	3
2006	Lindahl Equilibrium Versus Voluntary Contribution to a Public Good: The Role of the Income Distribution	FinanzArchiv	C	3
2005	Asymmetric contests with general technologies	Economic Theory	B	2
2003	An ideal Kyoto protocol: emissions trading, redistributive transfers and global participation	Oxford Economic Papers	C	3
2003	Risk Aversion, Heterogeneity and Contests.	Public Choice	B	2
2003	Public Good Mix in a Federation with Incomplete Information	Journal of Public Economic Theory	C	2
2002	Local public goods, inter-regional transfers and private information	European Economic Review	B	2
2000	Pure public goods and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility	Journal of Public Economics	A	3
2000	Local Public Goods, Risk Sharing, and Private Information in Federal Systems	Journal of Urban Economics	A	2
1999	Rotten Kids, Purity, and Perfection	Journal of Political Economy	S	2
1999	Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof via Contraction	Journal of Public Economic Theory	C	3
1994	The comparative static properties of the impure public good model	Journal of Public Economics	A	2
1993	Dyke Maintenance and Other Stories: Some Neglected Types of Public Goods	Quarterly Journal of Economics	S	1
1988	Expectations, the commons, and optimal group size	Journal of Environmental Economics and Management	A	3
1986	The Commons and the Optimal Number of Firms	Quarterly Journal of Economics	S	3
1985	[Title unavailable]	Economica	C	2
1985	Externalities, expectations, and pigouvian taxes	Journal of Environmental Economics and Management	A	2
1985	On the consistency of conjectures with public goods	Journal of Public Economics	A	2
1984	The theory of public goods: non-nash behaviour	Journal of Public Economics	A	2
1983	On Commons and Tragedies.	American Economic Review	S	2
1982	[Title unavailable]	Economica	C	1
1981	Gorman and Musgrave are dual : An Antipodean theorem on public goods	Economics Letters	C	2
1979	Consumption externalities and stability	Economics Letters	C	2