Fast-track authority: A hold-up interpretation

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of International Economics
Year: 2020
Volume: 127
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Under Fast-Track Authority (FT), the US Congress commits to an up-or-down vote without amendments for any trade agreement presented for ratification. We interpret FT in terms of a hold-up problem. If the US negotiates an agreement with a smaller economy, businesses there may make sunk investments for the US market. At the ratification stage, the partner economy will be locked in to the US in a way it was not previously and Congress can make changes adverse to the partner, so to convince the partner to negotiate, it must first commit not to amend the agreement. FT is then Pareto-improving.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:inecon:v:127:y:2020:i:c:s0022199620301070
Journal Field
International
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25