Institution: Center for Economic Research
Primary Field: Industrial Organization (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: https://sites.google.com/site/celiklev/
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 2.69 | 2.02 | 0.00 | 4.71 | 70% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 10.09 | 4.71 | 0.00 | 14.80 | 92% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Manipulation Through Biased Product Reviews | Journal of Industrial Economics | A | 3 |
| 2020 | Fast-track authority: A hold-up interpretation | Journal of International Economics | A | 3 |
| 2016 | Competitive provision of tune-ins under common private information | International Journal of Industrial Organization | B | 1 |
| 2015 | Product line design | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2015 | When Is It Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-Track Authority | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | B | 3 |
| 2014 | Information Unraveling Revisited: Disclosure of Horizontal Attributes | Journal of Industrial Economics | A | 1 |
| 2014 | A More General Framework to Analyze Whether Voluntary Disclosure is Insufficient or Excessive | Review of Industrial Organization | B | 1 |
| 2013 | Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining | Journal of International Economics | A | 3 |