Competitive cross‐subsidization

A-Tier
Journal: RAND Journal of Economics
Year: 2019
Volume: 50
Issue: 3
Pages: 645-665

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Cross‐subsidization arises naturally when firms with different comparative advantages compete for consumers with heterogeneous shopping patterns. Firms then face a form of co‐opetition, as they offer substitutes for one‐stop shoppers and complements for multi‐stop shoppers. When intense competition for one‐stop shoppers drives total prices down to cost, firms subsidize weak products with the profits made on strong products. Moreover, firms have incentives to seek comparative advantages on different products. Finally, banning below‐cost pricing increases firms' profits at the expense of one‐stop shoppers, which calls for a cautious use of below‐cost pricing regulations in competitive markets.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:randje:v:50:y:2019:i:3:p:645-665
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25