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Patrick Rey

Global rank #1058 98%

Institution: Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Primary Field: Industrial Organization (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://www.tse-fr.eu/people/patrick-rey

First Publication: 1986

Most Recent: 2024

RePEc ID: pre34 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 1.68 0.67 1.01 0.00 9.05
Last 10 Years 3.35 3.69 1.01 0.00 22.12
All Time 6.70 9.38 15.08 0.00 61.00

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 40
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 31.98

Publications (40)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2024 Coordination in the Fight against Collusion American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 4
2024 Consumer Search, Steering, and Choice Overload Journal of Political Economy S 2
2022 Organising Competition for the Market Journal of the European Economic Association A 3
2021 Vertical integration as a source of hold-up: An experiment European Economic Review B 4
2021 Policy Guidelines for Managing Unsolicited Proposals in Infrastructure Projects, Vol III: Review of Experiences with USPs Review of Economic Studies S 3
2019 Competitive cross‐subsidization RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2019 Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition Journal of Political Economy S 2
2018 Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition Economics Letters C 3
2018 Exclusive dealing and vertical integration in interlocking relationships Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2016 Vertical Integration as a Source of Hold-up Review of Economic Studies S 3
2016 Foreclosing Competition Through High Access Charges and Price Discrimination Journal of Industrial Economics A 2
2014 Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 4
2013 On the Design of Leniency Programs Journal of Law and Economics B 2
2013 Termination fees revisited International Journal of Industrial Organization B 3
2013 Non-Obviousness and Screening Journal of Industrial Economics A 3
2013 Does retailer power lead to exclusion? RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2012 Loss Leading as an Exploitative Practice American Economic Review S 2
2012 Abuse of dominance and licensing of intellectual property International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
2011 Collusion and leadership International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
2010 Vertical relations International Journal of Industrial Organization B 3
2010 RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS Journal of Industrial Economics A 2
2009 PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF PRE‐TRIAL BARGAINING* Journal of Industrial Economics A 3
2009 CRESSE SYMPOSIUM ON COMPETITION POLICY: PROCEDURES, INSTITUTIONS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
INTRODUCTION Journal of Industrial Economics A 3
2007 Resale price maintenance and collusion RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2007 Financing and access in cooperatives International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
2006 The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels International Journal of Industrial Organization B 3
2002 On partial contracting European Economic Review B 3
2002 Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion European Economic Review B 3
2000 Connectivity in the Commercial Internet Journal of Industrial Economics A 3
2000 Vertical Restraints and the Market Power of Large Distributors Review of Industrial Organization B 2
1999 Competition, Financial Discipline and Growth Review of Economic Studies S 3
1997 Corporate governance, competition policy and industrial policy European Economic Review B 3
1997 Competition between telecommunications operators European Economic Review B 3
1995 Strategic aspects of vertical delegation European Economic Review B 2
1994 Repeated moral hazard: The role of memory, commitment, and the access to credit markets European Economic Review B 4
1992 Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models Review of Economic Studies S 3
1990 On renegotiation design European Economic Review B 3
1989 Adverse selection and moral hazard with risk neutral agents European Economic Review B 3
1988 Vertical restraints and producers' competition European Economic Review B 2
1986 The Logic of Vertical Restraints American Economic Review S 2