Sabotage in contests: a survey

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2015
Volume: 164
Issue: 1
Pages: 135-155

Authors (2)

Subhasish Chowdhury (not in RePEc) Oliver Gürtler (Universität zu Köln)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A contest is a situation in which individuals expend irretrievable resources to win valuable prize(s). “Sabotage” is a deliberate and costly act of damaging a rival’s likelihood of winning the contest. Sabotage can be observed in, e.g., sports, war, promotion tournaments, and political or marketing campaigns. In this article, we provide a model of, and different perspectives on, such sabotage activities and review the economics literature analyzing the act of sabotage in contests. We discuss the theories and evidence emphasizing the means of sabotage, why sabotage occurs, and the effects of sabotage on individual contestants and on overall welfare, with possible means of reducing sabotage. We note that most sabotage activities are aimed at the ablest contestant, the possibility of sabotage reduces productive effort exerted by the contestants, and sabotage may lessen the effectiveness of public policies, such as affirmative action, or information revelation in contests. We discuss the different policies a designer might use to counteract sabotage. We conclude by pointing out some areas of future research. Copyright The Author(s) 2015

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:164:y:2015:i:1:p:135-155
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25