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Oliver Gürtler

Global rank #3953 95%

Institution: Universität zu Köln

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

First Publication: 2009

Most Recent: 2025

RePEc ID: pgr174 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 2.35 0.00 2.35
Last 10 Years 0.00 2.01 6.20 0.00 10.47
All Time 0.00 3.02 16.09 0.00 24.38

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 26
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 23.73

Publications (26)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2025 DO WORKERS BENEFIT FROM WAGE TRANSPARENCY RULES? International Economic Review B 2
2023 Competition and risk-taking European Economic Review B 3
2022 Simple equilibria in general contests Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2020 Firm choice and career success - theory and evidence European Economic Review B 4
2020 Strategic shirking in competitive labor markets: A general model of multi‐task promotion tournaments with employer learning Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 2
2019 Promotion signaling, discrimination, and positive discrimination policies RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2019 Do good and talk about it! Disclosure and reward of discretionary kindness Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 3
2018 Advertising and Labor Market Matching: A Tour through the Times Journal of Labor Economics A 2
2018 Market-based tournaments: An experimental investigation Labour Economics B 3
2017 THE PAYOFF TO CONSISTENCY IN PERFORMANCE Economic Inquiry C 4
2016 STRATEGIC SHIRKING: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTITASKING AND SPECIALIZATION International Economic Review B 2
2015 Sabotage in contests: a survey Public Choice B 2
2015 MONITORING OF WORKERS AND PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION: THE ROLE OF WORKS COUNCILS Economic Inquiry C 2
2015 The Optimality of Heterogeneous Tournaments Journal of Labor Economics A 2
2014 The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts: A signaling approach Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2013 Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants: Empirical Evidence from the Soccer Pitch Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 4
2013 Information Policy in Tournaments with Sabotage Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 3
2013 Communication and commitment in contests Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 3
2012 Optimal contracts for lenient supervisors Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2012 Inequality aversion and externalities Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2011 The first-order approach in rank-order tournaments Economics Letters C 1
2010 Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Experimental Evidence Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 2
2010 Optimal tournament contracts for heterogeneous workers Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2010 Sabotage in dynamic tournaments Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
2009 On the inefficiency of merger control Economics Letters C 2
2009 Hostile takeover and costly merger control Public Choice B 2