Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2018
Volume: 168
Issue: C
Pages: 77-81

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.505 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We revisit the group size paradox in a model where two groups of different sizes compete for a prize exhibiting a varying degree of rivalry and where group effort is given by a CES function of individual efforts. We show that the larger group can be more successful than the smaller group if the degree of complementarity is sufficiently high relative to the degree of rivalry of the prize.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:168:y:2018:i:c:p:77-81
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25