Institution: Université de Montpellier
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.04 | 0.00 | 4.04 | 78% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.04 | 1.51 | 5.55 | 74% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 4.04 | 8.07 | 3.03 | 15.14 | 92% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2021 | The evolutionary stability of in-group altruism in productive and destructive group contests | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 1 |
| 2018 | Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2016 | The political economy of (De)centralization with complementary public goods | Social Choice and Welfare | C | 1 |
| 2012 | The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2008 | Rent-seeking, spillovers and the benefits of decentralization | Journal of Urban Economics | A | 1 |
| 2002 | Seigniorage, Delegation and Common Currency: Why Monetary Unions May Fail? | Public Choice | B | 1 |
| 2001 | When a Monetary Union Fails: A Parable | Open Economies Review | C | 1 |
| 1998 | The New Geography of Eastern European Trade | Kyklos | C | 2 |