Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2013
Volume: 103
Issue: 2
Pages: 585-623

Authors (4)

Eric Budish (not in RePEc) Yeon-Koo Che (not in RePEc) Fuhito Kojima (not in RePEc) Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Randomization is commonplace in everyday resource allocation. We generalize the theory of randomized assignment to accommodate multi-unit allocations and various real-world constraints, such as group-specific quotas ("controlled choice") in school choice and house allocation, and scheduling and curriculum constraints in course allocation. We develop new mechanisms that are ex ante efficient and fair in these environments, and that incorporate certain non-additive substitutable preferences. We also develop a "utility guarantee" technique that limits ex post unfairness in random allocations, supplementing the ex ante fairness promoted by randomization. This can be applied to multi-unit assignment problems and certain two-sided matching problems. (JEL C78, D82)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:103:y:2013:i:2:p:585-623
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25