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Yeon-Koo Che

Institution: University of Wisconsin-Madison

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://www.columbia.edu/~yc2271

First Publication: 1994

Most Recent: 2024

RePEc ID: pch91 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total Percentile
Last 5 Years 8.07 2.02 0.00 0.00 10.09 95%
Last 10 Years 26.91 4.17 1.68 0.00 32.76 99%
All Time 61.22 21.66 12.78 2.35 98.02 99%

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 47
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 43.65

Publications (47)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2024 Prolonged Learning and Hasty Stopping: The Wald Problem with Ambiguity American Economic Review S 3
2023 Keeping the Listener Engaged: A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion Journal of Political Economy S 3
2021 To Trade, or not to Trade, that is the Question: New Roles for Incomplete Contracts in Dynamic Settings Journal of the European Economic Association A 2
2021 Policy Guidelines for Managing Unsolicited Proposals in Infrastructure Projects, Vol III: Review of Experiences with USPs Review of Economic Studies S 3
2020 Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching American Economic Review: Insights A 5
2019 Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention American Economic Review S 2
2019 Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets Journal of Political Economy S 2
2019 Stable Matching in Large Economies Econometrica S 3
2018 Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2018 Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning Quarterly Journal of Economics S 2
2017 An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2017 Disclosure and Legal Advice American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 2
2016 Decentralized College Admissions Journal of Political Economy S 2
2015 Expanding "Choice" in School Choice American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 3
2015 Efficient assignment with interdependent values Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2014 Credit Market Speculation and the Cost of Capital American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 2
2013 Pandering to Persuade American Economic Review S 3
2013 Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications American Economic Review S 4
2013 Efficient assignment mechanisms for liquidity-constrained agents International Journal of Industrial Organization B 3
2013 Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents Review of Economic Studies S 3
2011 Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered American Economic Review S 3
2010 Bidding with Securities: Comment American Economic Review S 2
2010 Do breakup fees lead to efficient takeover? Economics Letters C 3
2009 Optimal collusion-proof auctions Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2009 Opinions as Incentives Journal of Political Economy S 2
2008 Strategic judgment proofing RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2008 How to divide the possession of a football? Economics Letters C 2
2007 Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2007 The role of lockups in takeover contests RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2006 Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply American Economic Review S 2
2004 Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2003 Optimal Design of Research Contests American Economic Review S 2
2001 Optimal Incentives for Teams American Economic Review S 2
2000 Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2000 Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A Comment on De Fraja (1999) Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2000 The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1999 Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting American Economic Review S 2
1999 Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2 x 2 case1 European Economic Review B 2
1998 Caps on Political Lobbying. American Economic Review S 2
1998 Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders Review of Economic Studies S 2
1997 Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 2
1997 Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained. Public Choice B 2
1996 Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods. Journal of Industrial Economics A 1
1996 Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints Economics Letters C 2
1996 Equilibrium formation of class action suits Journal of Public Economics A 1
1995 Performance-Based Pricing for Nuclear Power Plants The Energy Journal B 2
1994 Buy-in through goldplating : The effect of defense profit policy on quality determination Economics Letters C 1