Salary History and Employer Demand: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
Year: 2025
Volume: 17
Issue: 3
Pages: 380-413

Authors (3)

Amanda Y. Agan (not in RePEc) Bo Cowgill (not in RePEc) Laura K. Gee (Tufts University)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study how salary disclosures affect employer demand using a field experiment featuring hundreds of recruiters evaluating over 2,000 job applications. We randomize the presence of salary questions and the candidates' disclosures for male and female applicants. Our findings suggest that extra dollars disclosed yield higher salary offers, willingness to pay, and perceptions of outside options by recruiters (all similarly for men and women). Recruiters make negative inferences about the quality and bargaining positions of nondisclosing candidates, though they penalize silent women less.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejapp:v:17:y:2025:i:3:p:380-413
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25