Honesty in tournaments

C-Tier

Journal: Economics Letters

Year: 2014

Volume: 123

Issue: 1

Pages: 90-93

Authors (5)

Conrads, Julian (not in RePEc) Irlenbusch, Bernd (not in RePEc) Rilke, Rainer Michael (Wissenschaftliche Hochschule f...) Schielke, Anne (not in RePEc) Walkowitz, Gari (Technische Universität München)

Score contribution per author:

0.201 = (α=2.01 / 5 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We apply the die rolling experiment of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) to a two-player tournament incentive scheme. Our treatments vary the prize spread. The data highlights that honesty is more pronounced when the prize spread is small.

Honesty in tournaments

Authors (5)

Abstract

Technical Details