Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Law and Economics
Year: 2011
Volume: 54
Issue: S4
Pages: S167 - S188

Authors (4)

Peter Cramton (not in RePEc) Evan Kwerel (not in RePEc) Gregory Rosston (not in RePEc) Andrzej Skrzypacz (Stanford University)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction but also in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments that regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/661939
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25