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Andrzej Skrzypacz

Global rank #680 99%

Institution: Stanford University

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://www.stanford.edu/~skrz/

First Publication: 2004

Most Recent: 2025

RePEc ID: psk11 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.67 1.34 0.00 0.00 5.36
Last 10 Years 5.70 1.34 1.68 0.00 27.15
All Time 12.23 9.38 8.21 0.00 75.91

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 33
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 29.96

Publications (33)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2025 Persuasion with Multiple Actions Journal of Political Economy S 3
2024 Disclosing a Random Walk Journal of Finance A 3
2023 The Design of Macroprudential Stress Tests The Review of Financial Studies A 3
2020 Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring Review of Economic Studies S 3
2020 Persuading the Principal to Wait Journal of Political Economy S 3
2019 Test Design and Minimum Standards American Economic Review S 3
2019 Costs and benefits of dynamic trading in a lemons market Review of Economic Dynamics B 2
2018 Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 3
2016 Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers Journal of Political Economy S 2
2016 Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction American Economic Review S 2
2016 Selling Information Journal of Political Economy S 2
2015 Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time Econometrica S 4
2015 Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2015 Recall and private monitoring Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2015 Mechanisms for Repeated Trade American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 2
2014 Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure American Economic Review S 3
2014 Limited records and reputation bubbles Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2013 Rules with Discretion and Local Information Quarterly Journal of Economics S 3
2013 Bridging the gap: Bargaining with interdependent values Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2013 Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 2
2013 Auctions with contingent payments — An overview International Journal of Industrial Organization B 1
2012 Beliefs and Private Monitoring Review of Economic Studies S 2
2011 Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services Journal of Law and Economics B 4
2011 Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices American Economic Review S 2
2010 Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders American Economic Review S 2
2007 Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production American Economic Review S 2
2007 Collusion under monitoring of sales RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2007 Dynamic signaling and market breakdown Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2006 Network externalities and long-run market shares Economic Theory B 2
2005 Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design American Economic Review S 3
2005 Inflation and price setting in a natural experiment Journal of Monetary Economics A 2
2004 Tacit collusion in repeated auctions Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2004 Corrigendum to "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions" [J. Econ. Theory 114 (2004) 153-169] Journal of Economic Theory A 2