The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2013
Volume: 93
Issue: C
Pages: 266-272

Authors (4)

Danilov, Anastasia (not in RePEc) Biemann, Torsten (not in RePEc) Kring, Thorn (not in RePEc) Sliwka, Dirk (Universität zu Köln)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In an experiment with professionals from the financial services sector, we investigate the impact of a team incentive scheme on the recommendation quality of investment products when advisors benefit from advising lower quality products. Experimental results reveal that, when group affiliation is strong, inferior products are recommended significantly more often under team incentives than under individual incentives.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:93:y:2013:i:c:p:266-272
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25