Cognitive Ability and Bidding Behavior in Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study

A-Tier
Journal: American Journal of Agricultural Economics
Year: 2020
Volume: 102
Issue: 5
Pages: 1494-1510

Authors (4)

Ji Yong Lee (not in RePEc) Rodolfo M. Nayga (Texas A&M University) Cary Deck (not in RePEc) Andreas C. Drichoutis (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper examines what connection, if any, there is between cognitive ability and bidding strategy in second price auctions. Despite truthful revelations being a weakly dominant strategy, previous experiments have consistently observed overbidding, which makes the use of such auctions for inferring homegrown values problematic. Examining the effect of cognitive ability is important, as it may help identify when one can reliably recover values from observed bids. The results indicate that more cognitively able subjects behave in closer accordance with theory, and that cognitive ability partially explains heterogeneity in bidding behavior. Our results suggest that considering subjects' cognitive ability in homegrown valuation studies can help identify the true underlying demand conditions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:ajagec:v:102:y:2020:i:5:p:1494-1510
Journal Field
Agricultural
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25