From public monopsony to competitive market: more efficiency but higher prices

C-Tier
Journal: Oxford Economic Papers
Year: 2009
Volume: 61
Issue: 3
Pages: 586-602

Score contribution per author:

0.505 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper examines the consequences of creating a fully competitive market in a sector previously dominated by a cost-minimizing public firm. Workers in the economy are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work in the sector. In line with empirical findings, our model implies that firms in the competitive market reach higher productivity and employ less workers than the public firm. Allocative efficiency therefore increases. Nevertheless, prices of the sector's output rise as competition between private firms for the best motivated workers leads to higher wage cost than under the public monopsony. Political support for liberalization may therefore be limited. Copyright 2009 , Oxford University Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:oxecpp:v:61:y:2009:i:3:p:586-602
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25