Frictions in internet auctions with many traders: A counterexample

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2016
Volume: 138
Issue: C
Pages: 81-84

Authors (3)

Donna, Javier (not in RePEc) Schenone, Pablo (Arizona State University) Veramendi, Gregory (Royal Holloway)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We show that when frictions are present, the Peters and Severinov (2006) (PS) bidding rule is no longer efficient nor a PBE of the PS game. Researchers should be cautious when using the PS bidding rule in markets with frictions like eBay.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:138:y:2016:i:c:p:81-84
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25