Networks, frictions, and price dispersion

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2020
Volume: 124
Issue: C
Pages: 406-431

Authors (3)

Donna, Javier D. (not in RePEc) Schenone, Pablo (not in RePEc) Veramendi, Gregory F. (Royal Holloway)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This article uses networks to study price dispersion in seller-buyer markets where buyers with unit demand interact with multiple, but not all, sellers; and buyers and sellers compete on prices after they meet. The central finding of this article is that price dispersion is determined by the structure of the network. First, for any given network we characterize the pairwise stable matchings and the prices that support them. Second, we characterize the set of all graphs where price dispersion is precluded. Third, we use a theorem from Frieze (1985) to show that the graphs where price dispersion is precluded arise asymptotically with probability one in random Poisson networks, even as the probability of each individual link goes to zero. Finally, we calibrate our model to the documented price dispersion at the online trading platform eBay and show how counterfactual network structures at eBay would substantially decrease price dispersion.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:124:y:2020:i:c:p:406-431
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25