Game form recognition in preference elicitation, cognitive abilities, and cognitive load

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2022
Volume: 193
Issue: C
Pages: 49-65

Authors (2)

Drichoutis, Andreas C. (not in RePEc) Nayga, Rodolfo M. (Texas A&M University)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This study further examines the failure of game form recognition in preference elicitation (Cason and Plott, 2014) by making elicitation more cognitively demanding through a cognitive load manipulation. We hypothesized that if subjects misperceive one game for another game, then by depleting their cognitive resources, subjects would misconceive the more-cognitively demanding task for the less-cognitively demanding task at a higher rate. We find no evidence that subjects suffer from a first-price-auction game-form misconception, but once cognitive resources are depleted, subjects’ choices are better explained by random choice. More cognitively able subjects are more immune to deviations from sub-optimal play than lower cognitively able subjects. Moreover, we find no support for partial game form recognition. Our results are robust to the integration of risk preferences in the analysis.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:193:y:2022:i:c:p:49-65
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25