School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2014
Volume: 153
Issue: C
Pages: 648-683

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Controlled choice over public schools attempts giving parents selection options while maintaining diversity of different student types. In practice, diversity constraints are often enforced by setting hard upper bounds and hard lower bounds for each student type. We demonstrate that, with hard bounds, there might not exist assignments that satisfy standard fairness and non-wastefulness properties; and only constrained non-wasteful assignments that are fair for same type students can be guaranteed to exist. We introduce the student exchange algorithm that finds a constrained efficient assignment among such assignments. To achieve fair (across all types) and non-wasteful assignments, we propose control constraints to be interpreted as soft bounds–flexible limits that regulate school priorities dynamically. In this setting, (i) the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm produces an assignment that Pareto dominates all other fair assignments while eliciting true preferences and (ii) the school-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm finds an assignment that minimizes violations of controlled choice constraints among fair assignments.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:153:y:2014:i:c:p:648-683
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25