|
2023
|
Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: District-based versus school-based admissions
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
1
|
|
2023
|
Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2022
|
Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
|
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
|
B
|
2
|
|
2021
|
Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets
|
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
|
B
|
4
|
|
2020
|
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient, Stable, and Maximum Matchings
|
Scandanavian Journal of Economics
|
B
|
2
|
|
2020
|
Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
B
|
4
|
|
2020
|
(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|
|
2018
|
Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|
|
2016
|
Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A market design approach
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2016
|
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2015
|
Matching markets under (in)complete information
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2014
|
Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|
|
2014
|
School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
4
|
|
2010
|
Externalities, potential, value and consistency
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2010
|
Manipulation via capacities revisited
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
1
|
|
2010
|
Efficient assignment respecting priorities
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2009
|
Oligarchies in spatial environments
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
B
|
2
|
|
2009
|
Choosing wisely: the natural multi-bidding mechanism
|
Economic Theory
|
B
|
1
|
|
2008
|
Sharing a river among satiable agents
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2008
|
Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2008
|
Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
B
|
2
|
|
2007
|
Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|
|
2007
|
Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2007
|
Consistent House Allocation
|
Economic Theory
|
B
|
2
|
|
2006
|
Efficient priority rules
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2005
|
Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2004
|
In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
1
|
|
2004
|
Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
2004
|
Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|
|
2003
|
Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
1
|
|
2003
|
Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice
|
Economic Theory
|
B
|
2
|
|
2002
|
Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|
|
2002
|
Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2002
|
On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|
|
2002
|
Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
B
|
1
|
|
2002
|
Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
B
|
3
|
|
2002
|
Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked
|
Economic Theory
|
B
|
1
|
|
2000
|
Indifference and the uniform rule
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|