Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: Uniqueness and characterization

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2018
Volume: 169
Issue: C
Pages: 51-54

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest admits a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium support is finite and includes the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:169:y:2018:i:c:p:51-54
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25