Institution: University of Macau
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.01 | 0.00 | 1.01 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 2.01 | 1.01 | 0.00 | 5.53 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 2.01 | 5.36 | 0.00 | 10.89 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | The n-player Hirshleifer contest | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2018 | Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: Uniqueness and characterization | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2017 | The Samuelson condition and the Lindahl scheme in networks | Journal of Public Economics | A | 1 |
| 2014 | The lure of illusory luck: How much are people willing to pay for random shocks | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 3 |
| 2006 | Is compulsory voting more democratic? | Public Choice | B | 2 |
| 2004 | General equilibria in large economies with endogenous structure of division of labor | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 3 |
| 2002 | Pay More Tribute to Smart Ants: A Note on the Tullockian Environmental Coordination in Non–Human Societies | Kyklos | C | 1 |
| 2000 | The measurement of structural differences between economies: An axiomatic characterization | Economic Theory | B | 2 |
| 1999 | The Effect of Number and Size of Interest Groups on Social Rent Dissipation. | Public Choice | B | 2 |