Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2001
Volume: 18
Issue: 2
Pages: 349-365

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state-contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed as an element of the core of the n-fold replicated economy, for every n. The converse holds under the further assumption of independent private values but not in general, as shown by a counter-example.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:349-365
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25