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Francoise Forges

Global rank #1829 97%

Institution: Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://sites.google.com/site/francoiseforges/

First Publication: 1986

Most Recent: 2018

RePEc ID: pfo80 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.00 1.01 0.00 1.01
All Time 2.01 5.03 17.43 0.00 37.37

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 24
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 28.27

Publications (24)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2018 Sender–receiver games with cooperation Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
2015 Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists Economics Letters C 2
2015 Bayesian repeated games and reputation Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2014 Afriat’s theorem for indivisible goods Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
2013 A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2013 Essential data, budget sets and rationalization Economic Theory B 2
2011 Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2011 Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
2009 Afriat's theorem for general budget sets Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2008 Long persuasion games Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2005 Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
2002 Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey Journal of Mathematical Economics B 3
2001 A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2001 Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies Economic Theory B 3
1998 Rational Choice in Strategic Environments: Further Observations Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 2
1998 Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1997 A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1997 Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations, Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1995 Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium. Economic Theory B 2
1994 A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies Economics Letters C 1
1994 Posterior Efficiency Games and Economic Behavior B 1
1990 Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example Quarterly Journal of Economics S 1
1988 Can sunspots replace a mediator? Journal of Mathematical Economics B 1
1986 A counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting Economics Letters C 3