Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2017
Volume: 107
Issue: 8
Pages: 2168-2203

Authors (4)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a field experiment with a retail chain (1,300 employees, 193 shops), randomly selected sales teams received a bonus. The bonus increases both sales and number of customers dealt with by 3 percent. Each dollar spent on the bonus generates $3.80 in sales, and $2.10 in profit. Wages increase by 2.2 percent while inequality rises only moderately. The analysis suggests effort complementarities to be important, and the effectiveness of peer pressure in overcoming free-riding to be limited. After rolling out the bonus treatment, and control shops' performance converge, suggesting long-term stability of the treatment effect.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:8:p:2168-2203
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25