A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 1999
Volume: 114
Issue: 4
Pages: 1321-1358

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We show that a framework that integrates job assignment, human-capital acquisition, and learning captures several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms, including the following. First, real-wage decreases are not rare but demotions are. Second, wage increases are serially correlated. Third, promotions are associated with large wage increases. Fourth, wage increases at promotion are small relative to the difference between average wages across levels of the job ladder. Fifth, workers who receive large wage increases early in their stay at one level of the job ladder are promoted quickly to the next.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:114:y:1999:i:4:p:1321-1358.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25