A Structural Analysis of Disappointment Aversion in a Real Effort Competition

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2012
Volume: 102
Issue: 1
Pages: 469-503

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We develop a novel computerized real effort task, based on moving sliders across a screen, to test experimentally whether agents are disappointment averse when they compete in a real effort sequential-move tournament. We predict that a disappointment averse agent, who is loss averse around her endogenous choice-acclimating expectations-based reference point, responds negatively to her rival's effort. We find significant evidence for this discouragement effect, and use the Method of Simulated Moments to estimate the strength of disappointment aversion on average and the heterogeneity in disappointment aversion across the population. (JEL C91, D12, D81, D84)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:1:p:469-503
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25