Product line design

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2015
Volume: 157
Issue: C
Pages: 517-526

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We characterize the product line choice and pricing of a monopolist from the upper envelope of net marginal revenue curves to the individual product demand functions. The equilibrium product line constitutes those varieties yielding the highest upper envelope. In a generalized vertical differentiation framework, the equilibrium line is exactly the same as the first-best socially optimal line. These upper envelope and first-best optimal line findings extend to symmetric Cournot oligopoly.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:517-526
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24