Social comparisons in oligopsony

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2017
Volume: 141
Issue: C
Pages: 196-209

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A large body of evidence suggests that social comparisons matter for workers’ valuation of the wage they receive. The consequences of social comparisons in imperfectly competitive labor markets are less well understood. We analyze an oligopsonistic model of the labor market where workers derive (dis-)utility from comparing their own wage with wages paid at other firms. As social comparisons become more prevalent all workers are paid higher wages, the wage distribution becomes more equal, and employment shifts to high productivity firms. Moreover, the total wage bill and output increase, while aggregate profits decline. Overall welfare rises. Our theoretical results have implications for estimating the elasticity of the labor supply curve facing a firm.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:141:y:2017:i:c:p:196-209
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25