Do good and talk about it! Disclosure and reward of discretionary kindness

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2019
Volume: 161
Issue: C
Pages: 323-342

Authors (3)

Gürtler, Oliver (Universität zu Köln) Walkowitz, Gari (not in RePEc) Wiesen, Daniel (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Does it pay off for companies to disclose voluntary commitments to their customers? While voluntary commitments to enhance customers’ benefits became prevalent in many markets, systematic evidence on how customers (if at all) reward companies, which disclose such discretionary kindness, is still lacking. We analyze the consequences of endogenous disclosure of discretionary kindness in a novel experiment (N=636). We model the decision situation in a bilateral reciprocity game with asymmetric information on the vol-untariness of kindness. Experimental data show that endogenously disclosing discretionary kindness significantly triggers rewards from customers and does not backfire. Findings are robust towards variations in costs of information and the level of customers’ benefits. Survey evidence from a vignette study support our behavioral findings.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:161:y:2019:i:c:p:323-342
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25