Tullock contests reward information advantages

C-Tier

Journal: Economics Letters

Year: 2018

Volume: 172

Issue: C

Pages: 34-36

Authors (6)

Aiche, Avishay (not in RePEc) Einy, Ezra (not in RePEc) Haimanko, Ori (Ben Gurion University of the N...) Moreno, Diego (Universidad Carlos III de Madr...) Sela, Aner (Ben Gurion University of the N...) Shitovitz, Benyamin (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.168 = (α=2.01 / 6 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

In Tullock contests in which the common value of the prize is uncertain, information advantages are rewarded: if a player i has better information about the value than some other player j, then the payoff of i is greater or equal to the payoff of j, regardless of the information of the other players.

Tullock contests reward information advantages

Authors (6)

Abstract

Technical Details