Tenancy rent control and credible commitment in maintenance

B-Tier
Journal: Regional Science and Urban Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 47
Issue: C
Pages: 72-85

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Under tenancy rent control, rents are regulated within a tenancy but not between tenancies. This paper investigates the effects of tenancy rent control on housing quality and maintenance. Since the discounted revenue received over a fixed-duration tenancy depends only on the starting rent, intuitively the landlord has an incentive to spruce up the unit between tenancies in order to “show” it well, but little incentive to maintain the unit well during the tenancy. The paper formalizes this intuition and presents numerical examples illustrating the efficiency loss from this effect.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:regeco:v:47:y:2014:i:c:p:72-85
Journal Field
Urban
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24