On the efficiency of the first price auction

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2017
Volume: 156
Issue: C
Pages: 159-161

Authors (2)

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel (Universidad Carlos III de Madr...) Michelucci, Fabio (Università Ca' Foscari Venezia)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We provide a natural setting in privatizations in which the equilibrium of the first price auction gives greater expected surplus than any equilibrium of the open ascending auction.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:156:y:2017:i:c:p:159-161
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25