Institution: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: https://sites.google.com/view/angelhernandoveciana
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 2.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.02 | 57% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 3.36 | 0.00 | 0.50 | 3.87 | 63% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 10.76 | 6.05 | 1.01 | 17.83 | 93% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2020 | Cheap Talk and Strategic Rounding in LIBOR Submissions | The Review of Financial Studies | A | 3 |
| 2017 | On the efficiency of the first price auction | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2015 | The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2014 | On the optimality of not allocating | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2013 | When are signals complements or substitutes? | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2011 | The insider's curse | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2011 | Second best efficiency and the English auction | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2009 | Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2005 | Competition among auctioneers in large markets | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2004 | Successful uninformed bidding | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |