Regulatory arbitrage in teacher hiring and retention: Evidence from Massachusetts Charter Schools

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Public Economics
Year: 2022
Volume: 215
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Bruhn, Jesse (not in RePEc) Imberman, Scott (Michigan State University) Winters, Marcus (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study personnel flexibility in charter schools by exploring how teacher retention varies with teacher quality in Massachusetts. We propose a model in which educators with high fixed-costs use charter schools to explore teaching careers before obtaining licenses required for higher paying public sector jobs. A key implication of the theoretical model is that charter schools create positive externalities for traditional public schools by increasing the average quality of available teacher labor. Empirical results show patterns consistent with the model. In particular, we show that charters are more likely to lose their highest and lowest value-added teachers. Low performers tend to exit public education, while high performers tend to switch to traditional public schools.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:pubeco:v:215:y:2022:i:c:s0047272722001529
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25