Soft Commitments, Reminders, and Academic Performance

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
Year: 2019
Volume: 11
Issue: 2
Pages: 114-42

Authors (3)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We provide first evidence that a soft commitment device enhances progress in education and, more generally, improves the completion of complex tasks—such as passing exams. In our field experiment, students can sign a nonbinding agreement and commit to staying on track for graduation. We find that those who were offered the soft commitment device are more likely to sign up for, take part in, and pass exams. A pure reminder treatment does not change behavior, which suggests that the effects are not driven by increased salience. We also show that procrastinators benefit most from the commitment device.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejapp:v:11:y:2019:i:2:p:114-42
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25