Bertrand Competition Under Uncertainty

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Industrial Economics
Year: 2002
Volume: 50
Issue: 1
Pages: 11-21

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We look at a Bertrand model in which each firm may be inactive with a known probability, so the number of active firms is uncertain. The model has a mixed‐strategy equilibrium, in which industry profits are positive and decline with the number of firms, the same features which make the Cournot model attractive. Unlike those in a Cournot model with similar uncertainty, Bertrand profits always increase in the probability that firms are inactive. Profits decline more sharply than in the Cournot model, the pattern found empirically in Bresnahan and Reiss [1991].

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jindec:v:50:y:2002:i:1:p:11-21
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25