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Eric Rasmusen

Global rank #2732 96%

Institution: Indiana University

Primary Field: Industrial Organization (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://www.rasmusen.org

First Publication: 1988

Most Recent: 2012

RePEc ID: pra42 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
All Time 0.67 6.03 14.75 0.00 33.51

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 19
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 29.62

Publications (19)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2012 First Versus Second Mover Advantage with Information Asymmetry about the Profitability of New Markets Journal of Industrial Economics A 2
2011 Executive Compensation in Japan: Estimating Levels and Determinants from Tax Records Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 3
2010 Career concerns and ambiguity aversion Economics Letters C 1
2007 When Does Extra Risk Strictly Increase an Option's Value? The Review of Financial Studies A 1
2002 Bertrand Competition Under Uncertainty Journal of Industrial Economics A 2
2000 Naked Exclusion: Reply American Economic Review S 3
1998 The observed choice problem in estimating the cost of policies Economics Letters C 1
1998 Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification : Timur Kuran, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 1
1998 Observed Choice and Optimism in Estimating the Effects of Government Policies. Public Choice B 1
1997 Choosing among Signalling Equilibria in Lobbying Games: A Reply to Sloof. Public Choice B 1
1996 Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality. Journal of Law and Economics B 1
1996 The Posner argument for transferring health spending from old women to olden men Economics Letters C 1
1994 Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game among Rational Legislators. Public Choice B 2
1993 Lobbying When the Decisionmaker Can Acquire Independent Information. Public Choice B 1
1991 Naked Exclusion. American Economic Review S 3
1991 Extending the Economic Theory of Regulation to the Form of Policy. Public Choice B 2
1989 A simple model of product quality with elastic demand Economics Letters C 1
1988 Entry for Buyout. Journal of Industrial Economics A 1
1988 Mutual Banks and Stock Banks. Journal of Law and Economics B 1