Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts: Corrigendum

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2020
Volume: 12
Issue: 3
Pages: 277-85

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Hatfield and Kominers (2012) introduced a model of matching in networks with bilateral contracts and showed that stable outcomes exist in supply chains when firms' preferences over contracts are fully substitutable. Hatfield and Kominers (2012) also asserted that in their setting, full substitutability is equivalent to the assumption that all indirect utility representations of each firm's preferences are quasisubmodular; we show here that this claimed equivalence result does not hold in general. We show instead that full substitutability is equivalent to weak quasisubmodularity of all indirect utility representations.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:12:y:2020:i:3:p:277-85
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25