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Scott Duke Kominers

Global rank #957 98%

Institution: Harvard University

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://www.scottkom.com/

First Publication: 2010

Most Recent: 2025

RePEc ID: pko394 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 3.59 0.67 2.41 0.00 18.77
Last 10 Years 6.94 0.67 6.94 0.00 37.28
All Time 9.02 3.35 12.63 0.00 58.16

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 39
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 30.66

Publications (39)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2025 Collusion in Brokered Markets Journal of Finance A 3
2024 An Economic Framework for Vaccine Prioritization* Quarterly Journal of Economics S 4
2024 Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms Journal of Political Economy S 3
2024 On the Representativeness of Voter Turnout Journal of Law and Economics B 2
2023 Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement American Economic Review S 3
2023 Algorithmic Mechanism Design With Investment Econometrica S 5
2022 Vaccines and the Covid-19 pandemic: lessons from failure and success Oxford Review of Economic Policy C 2
2022 Distributing a billion vaccines: COVAX successes, challenges, and opportunities Oxford Review of Economic Policy C 6
2021 Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 5
2021 Redistribution Through Markets Econometrica S 3
2021 Auctioneers sometimes prefer entry fees to extra bidders International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
2021 On Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of Stable Matchings with Contracts Review of Economic Studies S 3
2020 Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets Journal of Mathematical Economics B 3
2020 TAXATION IN MATCHING MARKETS International Economic Review B 4
2020 Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts: Corrigendum American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 3
2020 Collusion in Markets with Syndication Journal of Political Economy S 4
2019 Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility Journal of Political Economy S 3
2018 A Theory of Intergenerational Mobility Journal of Political Economy S 4
2018 Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones Journal of Political Economy S 4
2018 Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2018 BIG DATA AND BIG CITIES: THE PROMISES AND LIMITATIONS OF IMPROVED MEASURES OF URBAN LIFE Economic Inquiry C 4
2017 An invitation to market design Oxford Review of Economic Policy C 3
2017 Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments American Economic Review S 3
2017 Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2017 Who will vote quadratically? Voter turnout and votes cast under quadratic voting Public Choice B 2
2016 Crowdsourcing City Government: Using Tournaments to Improve Inspection Accuracy American Economic Review S 4
2015 Agglomerative Forces and Cluster Shapes Review of Economics and Statistics A 2
2015 Multilateral matching Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2014 Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2014 Investment Incentives in Labor Market Matching American Economic Review S 3
2013 Vacancies in supply chain networks Economics Letters C 2
2013 Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks Journal of Political Economy S 5
2012 Discrete choice cannot generate demand that is additively separable in own price Economics Letters C 2
2012 Holdout in the Assembly of Complements: A Problem for Market Design American Economic Review S 2
2012 Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 2
2012 Testing substitutability Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2012 On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2010 Information can wreck cooperation: A counterpoint to Kandori (1992) Economics Letters C 2
2010 Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching Games and Economic Behavior B 1