Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 1999
Volume: 66
Issue: 4
Pages: 971-991

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The consumption of an indivisible good causes identity-dependent externalities to non-consumers. We analyse resale markets where the current owner designs the trading procedure, but cannot commit to future actions. We ask the following questions: (1) Does the identity of the initial owner matter for the determination of the final consumer? (2) Is the outcome always efficient? The major conclusion of our paper is that the irrelevance of the initial structure of property rights arises in resale processes even if there are transaction costs that hinder efficiency. This result complements the Coasian view where the irrelevance of the assignment of property rights is a consequence of efficiency.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:66:y:1999:i:4:p:971-991.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25