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Philippe Jehiel

Global rank #203 99%

Institution: Paris School of Economics

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://www.enpc.fr/ceras/jehiel/

First Publication: 1992

Most Recent: 2024

RePEc ID: pje39 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 2.51 3.18 0.00 8.21
Last 10 Years 3.02 4.52 3.18 0.00 24.30
All Time 16.76 19.61 18.94 0.00 125.43

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 51
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 56.04

Publications (51)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2024 Everyday Econometricians: Selection Neglect and Overoptimism When Learning from Others American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 3
2024 Can affirmative action policies be inefficiently persistent? European Economic Review B 2
2023 The analogical foundations of cooperation Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2022 Non-Bayesian updating in a social learning experiment Journal of Economic Theory A 4
2021 Information Redundancy Neglect versus Overconfidence: A Social Learning Experiment American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 4
2021 Multi-state choices with aggregate feedback on unfamiliar alternatives Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2021 An experiment on deception, reputation and trust Experimental Economics A 2
2020 Bounded memory and biases in information processing Economic Journal A 2
2020 On the Benefits of Set-Asides Journal of the European Economic Association A 2
2018 Investment Strategy and Selection Bias: An Equilibrium Perspective on Overoptimism American Economic Review S 1
2018 A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis Journal of Political Economy S 2
2015 Financial reporting and market efficiency with extrapolative investors Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2015 On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry American Economic Review S 2
2015 On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2015 On Transparency in Organizations Review of Economic Studies S 1
2013 Social Learning with Coarse Inference American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 2
2012 Locally robust implementation and its limits Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2012 Reputation with Analogical Reasoning Quarterly Journal of Economics S 2
2011 Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2010 Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective Journal of Political Economy S 2
2010 A Theory of Deception American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 2
2009 Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 2
2008 Gathering information before signing a contract: A screening perspective International Journal of Industrial Organization B 2
2008 Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2008 Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials Economic Theory B 3
2007 On Quitting Rights in Mechanism Design American Economic Review S 2
2007 Auctions and information acquisition: sealed bid or dynamic formats? RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2007 Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation Economics Letters C 4
2007 Mixed bundling auctions Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2006 License Auctions and Market Structure Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 3
2006 Partnership dissolution with interdependent values RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2005 Analogy-based expectation equilibrium Journal of Economic Theory A 1
2005 Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2005 How to win a decision in a confederation Journal of Public Economics A 2
2005 Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies Journal of Political Economy S 2
2004 Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games Review of Economic Studies S 2
2003 Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2003 ‘Auctions of shares’ Economic Policy B 2
2001 Limited Foresight May Force Cooperation Review of Economic Studies S 1
2001 Constitutional Rules of Exclusion in Jurisdiction Formation Review of Economic Studies S 2
1999 Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities, Journal of Economic Theory A 3
1999 Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights Review of Economic Studies S 2
1998 Bargaining while searching for outside options: A potential role for unions European Economic Review B 3
1998 Repeated games and limited forecasting European Economic Review B 1
1998 Learning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria Games and Economic Behavior B 1
1997 Bargaining between benevolent jurisdictions or when delegation induces inefficiencies Journal of Public Economics A 1
1996 How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons. American Economic Review S 3
1995 How to Select a Dual Nash Equilibrium Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1995 Limited Horizon Forecast in Repeated Alternate Games Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1995 Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities Review of Economic Studies S 2
1992 Product differentiation and price collusion International Journal of Industrial Organization B 1