Economic progress and skill obsolescence with network effects

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2005
Volume: 26
Issue: 1
Pages: 177-201

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We construct an OLG model with network effects to examine skill obsolescence when individuals can choose technological vintages. In the absence of transfer payments, some regions of the parameter space have unique stationary equilibria, others have unique cyclical equilibria, and others have multiple stationary equilibria. All equilibria are Pareto efficient. However, “rat race” equilibria can exist in which all agents currently alive prefer a slower rate of progress than occurs in equilibrium. When contemporaneous transfers are allowed, equilibria are unique everywhere, but a cycle still exists, and a rat race can still arise in equilibrium. Allowing intertemporal transfers (debt) ensures that all equilibria are stationary. In the relevant parameter range, the introduction of debt can eliminate cycles and increase the long-run growth rate. No rat race equilibria exist when debt is allowed. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:177-201
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25