A characterization of the top-trading-cycles mechanism for housing markets via respecting-improvement

C-Tier

Journal: Economics Letters

Year: 2025

Volume: 247

Issue: C

Authors (3)

Klaus, Bettina (Université de Lausanne) Klijn, Flip (Barcelona School of Economics ...) Sethuraman, Jay (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We provide the first characterization of the prominent top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism in the Shapley–Scarf housing market model (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) that uses respecting-improvement. Specifically, we show that for strict preferences, the TTC mechanism is the unique mechanism satisfying pair-efficiency, respecting-improvement, and strategy-proofness.

A characterization of the top-trading-cycles mechanism for housing markets via respecting-improvement

Authors (3)

Abstract

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