Loading...

← Back to Leaderboard

Bettina Klaus

Global rank #1512 98%

Institution: Université de Lausanne

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://www.bklaus.net/

First Publication: 1997

Most Recent: 2025

RePEc ID: pkl18 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 4.02 0.00 4.36
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.67 11.06 0.00 13.24
All Time 0.00 3.02 27.82 0.00 36.36

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 35
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 36.01

Publications (35)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2025 A characterization of the top-trading-cycles mechanism for housing markets via respecting-improvement Economics Letters C 3
2025 Core stability and strategy-proofness in hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2024 Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2024 Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2023 The core for housing markets with limited externalities Economic Theory B 2
2021 How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2020 Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices Economic Theory B 2
2019 Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2018 Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
2017 Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2017 Consistency and its converse for roommate markets Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2016 Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2016 Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists Economics Letters C 2
2016 Stochastic stability in assignment problems Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
2013 Local and global consistency properties for student placement Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
2011 A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets Journal of Mathematical Economics B 3
2011 Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2010 Stochastic stability for roommate markets Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2010 Farsighted house allocation Journal of Mathematical Economics B 3
2009 Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts Economic Theory B 2
2009 "Fair marriages": An impossibility Economics Letters C 1
2009 Corrigendum to "Stable matchings and preferences of couples" [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75-106] Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2009 Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
2008 The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible Journal of Mathematical Economics B 1
2007 Consistent House Allocation Economic Theory B 2
2007 Paths to stability for matching markets with couples Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2007 Corrigendum to “On randomized matching mechanisms” [Economic Theory 8(1996)377–381] Economic Theory B 2
2006 Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods Economics Letters C 3
2006 Efficient priority rules Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2006 Procedurally fair and stable matching Economic Theory B 2
2005 Stable matchings and preferences of couples Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2002 Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems Journal of Mathematical Economics B 3
2001 Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object Games and Economic Behavior B 1
1997 Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped Economics Letters C 3
1997 Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good Economic Theory B 3