Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2001
Volume: 34
Issue: 1
Pages: 64-82

Authors (1)

Klaus, Bettina (Université de Lausanne)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:1:p:64-82
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25